Tragedy of the anticommons
INTRODUCTION

Michael Heller's The Gridlock Economy
3 warns radio spectrum regulators: divvy up rights for the use of frequencies into tiny, fragmented, overlapping parcels, and you invite social loss. 4 This echoes and expands the original scholarly warning issued by Ronald Coase, 5 who saw that the parsimonious use rights issued by government regulators did not extend private parties the degrees of freedom needed to coordinate optimal spectrum resource employments.
This paper focuses on tragedy of the anticommons in the U.S. spectrum allocation known as the TV Band. 6 The inquiry has both general and specific payoffs. Generally, Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules for allocating spectrum are clearly on display in the TV Band, and the economic inefficiencies they engender are easily analyzed. For instance, the property rights awarded economic agents produce a widespread waste of resources while thwarting efficient transactions, illustrating the large social losses defining -tragedy.‖ Specifically, the policies being carried out for TV Band spectrum allocation are ongoing. New rules could, going forward, avert tragedies that previous policies have caused. Services generating over $1 trillion in consumer surplus are available under a rights regime that takes Professor Heller's advice to avoid wealth-destroying property fragmentation.
In addition, the TV Band policy process exposes a modern attack on Coase's approach to radio spectrum regulation and, by implication, to Michael Heller's encomium on property rights. The idea motivating current policy is that transactions between property owners impose needless costs; to achieve optimal social results, government regulators should plan for additional -spectrum commons‖ that allow non-exclusive use rights to squeeze full social benefits from bandwidth. -The property approach made sense in 1960, but is now questionable.‖ 7 As will be shown, this view mischaracterizes wireless technology, spectrum regulation, transaction costs, and the efficiency properties associated with alternative property rights structures. This dirigiste offensive attempts to resuscitate the ancien regime of traditional spectrum allocation, empowering regulators to control -harmful interference.‖ The U.S. TV Band allocation vividly demonstrates the non-market failure that results.
), policy makers ostensibly avert tragedy. Apropos of Heller's argument that inefficient over-use is more visible than inefficient under-use, 13 actions to limit spectrum access regularly result in under-consumption of wireless services, what I have previously called Type II error by regulators. 14 This outcome generally obtains when government follows the traditional path. Licenses mandate specific uses, prohibiting applications or technologies not expressly authorized. So, in the TV license, a specified party is granted the right to broadcast a video signal from a particular location (and height) at a given power level using a technology standard determined by the regulator. The business model is likewise fixed. Video must be transmitted free to customers; ad-supported services are authorized while subscription-only services are precluded. Some rules have been adjusted or relaxed for digital TV licenses, but the basic rights truncation remains: a station owner cannot decide that the 6 MHz allocated to the station's license would be better used for some service other than over-the-air 8.
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The regime has led to the stasis predicted. 16 Perhaps in response to the intellectual consensus or due to changing economic circumstances, policy makers in the United States and around the world have moved away from the state property model in allocating spectrum for mobile phone services. As this industry emerged and eclipsed other wireless services in economic importance, the regulatory system evolved and further altered markets.
While the basic administrative allocation regime is still intact, regulators have increasingly relied on non-traditional methods for controlling interference. In crafting licenses for cellular services, U.S. regulators widely delegate spectrum use choices to licensees. 17 Service providers have discretion to choose their applications, wireless technologies, and business models. 18 Interference between millions of cell phone users is endemic, as users and application suppliers compete to gain access to the network. These conflicts are left to the cellular licensee to resolve under a -liberal license‖ regime, sharply contrasting with the -traditional license‖ under which most spectrum use rights are retained by the regulatory authority. 19 In addition to this move towards in rem, as opposed to in personam, property rights, spectrum regulators have increasingly come to rely on so-called unlicensed band allocations. 20 While labeled -spectrum commons,‖ band access is regulated, largely via rules embedded in the process wherein radios using these airwaves are authorized for sale. Unlicensed bands have been set aside by the FCC since at least 1938; 21 the most important step in this regulatory path was the decision to relax equipment licensing rules for spread spectrum devices in 1985. The basics of the system we use today were established when the most important use of the spectrum was broadcasting and the range of usable spectrum was about 1% of what it is today. Few would argue that this system is optimal today, but many may lose if the system were changed. The system is so embedded in how we use the spectrum that change is practically unthinkable . . . . Is this a system that is admittedly highly inefficient yet with so many stakeholders that it cannot be changed? Id. 17. Hazlett This reform is commonly credited with facilitating popular use of the 900 MHz and 2.4 MHz unlicensed bands for cordless phones and Wi-Fi radios, among other devices. 23 These developments leave regulators with three alternative approaches 24 for allocating spectrum use rights: traditional licenses that authorize particular services and technologies, liberal licenses that delegate spectrum sharing rules to licensees, or unlicensed bands with non-exclusive use rights limited by radio regulation.
Enthusiasm over the economic performance observed in unlicensed bands, as well as criticism of the perceived transaction costs associated with private property rights in spectrum, has led to claims that scarcity has-or soon will-disappear as a relevant constraint for spectrum users. 25 Pointing to advances in wireless technology that permit far greater traffic to be communicated over given bandwidth, and radios that are increasingly robust to interference from other radio emissions, some champion the notion that scarcity has been rendered moot. 26 If so, the costs of defining and enforcing property rights are not likely compensated by commensurate benefits. This evolution serves as prelude to current regulatory choices being made with respect to use of the TV Band. Regulators have historically set aside extremely valuable bandwidth for video distribution services-terrestrial broadcast in 210 local markets-that now face low-cost substitutes in the form of cable and satellite TV networks. 27 With changing technologies and economics, the -proper combinations of resources‖ 28 are in flux. Allowing markets to reconfigure spectrum usage would produce enormous social gains. 29 This Article describes and evaluates the response of U.S. regulators to these challenges. The analysis begins with an examination of the regime shift paradigm in radio spectrum. It then describes the twenty-two year transition from 30 It next focuses on the existing Federal Communications Commission plan to approve new radio devices to access TV Band -white spaces,‖ sharing spectrum with digital TV stations. Finally, the Article advances the perspective that the current policy path, mixing non-exclusive use rights with traditional TV licenses, condemns the spectrum allocation to -junk band‖ status. While evidence demonstrates that efficient contracts could move TV broadcasters to alternative platforms, creating hundreds of billions of dollars in net benefits, the investments necessary to achieve these bountiful gains from trade depend on the creation of exclusive spectrum ownership rights. This analysis strongly supports Michael Heller's skepticism of policies that distribute -one-inch‖ rights.
31
I. THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OBSOLESCENCE ARGUMENT
There are two key components of the spectrum regime shift argument: (a) transaction costs, taken as largely eliminated in unlicensed allocations, are seen as inefficiently imposed under exclusive property rights; and (b) marketplace activity, evincing a perceived migration from licensed to unlicensed bands, is asserted to demonstrate that radios need progressively less in the way of property rules in order to peacefully coexist. In its strong form, the latter argument is taken to imply that new wireless technologies have effectively ended spectrum scarcity.
Neither component is compelling. The first argument is theoretically flawed, reflecting a misinterpretation of transaction costs. The second is empirically contradicted by evidence from developing wireless markets.
A. Transaction Costs
Taking a cue from Coase, who offered high transaction costs as a reason to potentially favor government regulation over the -price system,‖ 32 unlicensed spectrum is posited as a low-cost substitute for exclusive property rights. In unlicensed bands, -transactions‖ are alleged to disappear because -open access‖ obtains. Charles Jackson, 33 numerically illustrating the relatively high cost of small airwave access transactions, finds that sporadically used devices making tiny encroachments on other frequency users (such as garage door openers or wireless car locks) provide services whose value would be swamped by the expense of
30.
The 34 Unlicensed bands are said to avoid these costs of using the price system, as dedicated bandwidth is set aside for -free‖ use.
35
This reasoning recalls the Pigouvian analysis that Coase sought to correct. A.C. Pigou saw costs (or benefits) as ignored by private actors to whom the consequences of certain actions were external. 36 This -market failure‖ was resolved when government imposed taxes or subsidies to reflect the magnitude of the external effects, altering prices facing economic decisionmakers and thereby forcing individuals to take proper account of all consequences of their actions. The public corrective was, by assumption, imposed without cost. Coase showed that when such an assumption was symmetrically employed for private sector activity, agents would transact to eliminate externalities prior to the imposition of taxes and subsidies. Pigou's market failure and policy result were the product not of welfare analysis but of asymmetric assumptions.
Coase focused on why some externalities went unresolved. 37 Given that private parties seek to exploit gains from trade, the lack of a market solution suggested one of two possibilities. Either the existing -harmful effect‖ was not worth fixing, or the costs of bargaining to create an improvement outweighed potential gains. In the former case the efficient equilibrium obtained via the price system; in the latter, Coase suggested that transaction costs might be lowered by institutional reforms, including economic regulation. 38 The usefulness of such an approach would depend on the costs and benefits of the public policy intervention.
The argument that unlicensed spectrum categorically economizes on transaction costs reflects the Pigouvian asymmetry. Costs are incurred in coordinating the use of scarce resources under traditional licenses, liberal licenses, or unlicensed spectrum allocations. They, of course, differ in form and magnitude, depending on circumstances. Coase's 1959 analysis, a theoretical treatment of the two leading institutional alternatives, concluded that traditional licenses incurred higher organizational costs than would liberal licenses, all else equal. 39 A similar analysis, fortified with the rich empirical evidence now available, is required in the current regime shift debate.
34.
The signals sent by these radios require very little bandwidth and last, in aggregate, only a few seconds per day per user. Id. at 28.
In fact, unlicensed bands are not -open entry‖ 40 or -frequencies that no one controls.‖ 41 Regulators seek to control spectrum use, protecting against resource dissipation by imposing rules that incur significant social costs. Chief among these is the value of the services that would be available but for such unlicensed device rules. 42 While much of the policy discussion labels such bands -commons,‖ associating the non-exclusive use rights issued by regulators with -open access,‖ 43 unlicensed bands are not owned by users or other private actors but are creatures of public authority. Decisionmakers setting resource appropriation rules do not internalize the costs or benefits they create, but make choices to advance -public interest, convenience, or necessity.‖ 44 The usage of unlicensed bandwidth is organized via governance rules. 45 The purpose and effect of these regulations is to limit rivalry so as to mitigate potential conflicts. 46 That the mechanism employed to control congestion is governance rather than exclusion-which delegates spectrum sharing rules to owners, as with the issuance of liberal licenses-alters the form of the rules but not the underlying fact that valuable opportunities are being sacrificed to obtain other objectives.
The coordinating mechanisms in unlicensed spectrum impose social costs by blocking transactions that would occur in their absence. The standard restrictions are characterized thus:
It is almost universal practice to postpone or avoid the effects of congestion by imposing limits on the purposes to which unlicensed spectrum can be put with respect to (i) use, including use to provide service to the public; (ii) equipment permitted; (iii) the power at 40.
Werbach, supra note 7, at 901. 41.
Benkler, supra note 25, at 30. 42.
Faulhaber & Farber, supra note 16, at 18 (discussing the administrative and rent-seeking costs incurred in allocating unlicensed spectrum, but not, in the transactional context, the opportunity costs incurred by excluding valuable services available under alternative property regimes).
43. which the equipment may be used; and (iv) the enforcement of politeness protocols, which reduce interference.
47
Jon Peha captures the simple regulatory choices in Table 1 . Peha, an engineer who has served as Chief Technologist at the FCC, ties the distinct policy alternatives to differential -application requirements,‖ 48 a categorization that is broadly correct but which also features important deviations that yield further insight into the economics of alternative approaches. 49 The three regimes he identifies track those posited above: Traditional License, Band Manager, and Unlicensed. 49. It is possible for a particular service provider to use an unlicensed band to provide quality of service guarantees. The economic problem is that the network infrastructure to provide such services is relatively expensive given the constraints of regulation and the non-exclusive use rights issued. Likewise, where a licensee controls bandwidth, -best efforts‖ services (as opposed to those with Quality of Service promisesQoS) can be (and are) supplied as lower-cost delivery options. Indeed, wireless voice services do not attain the -5 9s‖ reliability of fixed line networks. Notwithstanding such exceptions, the general delineation of where different types of applications are accommodated-capturing rules of thumb used by engineers and reflecting common sense in the marketplace-illustrates that unlicensed bands are highly imperfect substitutes for liberal licenses.
50. Peha, supra note 48, at 12 tbl.1.
51.
Id.
must be offset by demonstrated benefits in order for the administrative allocation system to claim transaction cost efficiencies.
This result cannot be categorically asserted. To wit, the Unlicensed Personal Communication Services (PCS) (U-PCS) band, allocated some 30 MHz in the early 1990s, has generated next to nothing in the way of productive services, 52 while adjacent Licensed PCS bandwidth has been intensely utilized (for more than a decade) by mobile phone carriers. Given that the value of a marginal 30 MHz in the latter employment is estimated at nearly $70 billion over just seven years, 53 U-PCS allocations imposed social costs of very high magnitude. That the allocation mandated smart protocols (-listen before talk,‖ sometimes touted as cutting edge technology for organizing -spectrum commons‖ 54 ) did not, on net, mitigate transaction costs.
General improvements in wireless technology are increasing opportunities for communications but have not reduced the advantages evident via exclusive spectrum ownership. All relevant wireless options present trade-offs. More investment in one mechanism or technology can save costs elsewhere; restricting certain emissions can create better access or throughput for others. To paraphrase Mark Twain, the death of spectrum scarcity has been greatly exaggerated.
55
Before leaving the issue of transaction costs, an empirical note is warranted. Spectrum owners 56 do not, in fact, price tiny increments of wireless activity. Rather, they create and market large packages. A typical cellular network customer will sign a two-year contract for spectrum/network access, and make thousands of -spectrum transactions‖ during that time (sending and receiving calls, texting, emailing, web surfing, etc.). Carriers package such purchases in bundles that reduce transaction costs.
52.
See These efficiencies, which occur because spectrum owners and their consumers internalize transaction costs, are widely distributed. Jackson is right to see the dedication of bandwidth for the use of certain radios as a potential economizing device. 57 But he is incorrect in characterizing this as a unique feature of unlicensed bands, and in omitting the opportunity cost of an unlicensed spectrum set-aside as an offset to the potential savings. In licensed bands, wireless phone carriers authorize equipment makers to construct devices that access the bands they control (and use the protocols necessary to communicate with network base stations and other radio devices). 58 The transaction-saving process is in evidence in the private property alternative, with the advantage that -band managers‖ offer rival services, networks, and technologies in a feedback environment that rewards efficiency.
B. Market Migration
Scientific advancement in wireless systems is currently profound-and has been for at least the past century. 59 Yet its trajectory has failed to undermine the cost-benefit calculus favoring decentralized private property. Indeed, the overwhelmingly dominant social value in the sector has emerged in the cellular telephone market, where 4.6 billion global subscribers now enjoy network access facilitated by the most liberal spectrum property rights issued by regulators.
60
Prime spectrum bands, as well as previously worthless frequencies, are becoming increasingly scarce as per improved radios. 61 Competing service providers bid more aggressively for access rights. With exclusivity, these demands register economically, moving resources to higher valued uses. For resource rights held by regulators, the bids are registered politically; that allocation process consists of government rule makings.
Spectrum, worthless in 1895 prior to Guglielmo Marconi's radio innovation, is now highly prized and contentiously sought. The intensification of scarcity is empirically revealed in the (1) social values produced via the use of exclusively assigned spectrum inputs; (2) valuations in wireless license auctions; (3) relative levels of overall economic activity enabled by liberal licenses; and (4) high growth rates in investment and data flows over wireline networks, where spectrum is privately owned de jure. These points are considered in sequence.
57.
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 58.
Not only do consumers purchase phones that, out of the box, work on specified wireless networks, but myriad other devices-including Amazon's Kindle, GM's OnStar, and emerging machine-to-machine (M2M) communicators-embed technology to access those airwaves controlled by private carriers.
59. 
Liberal License Spectrum Inputs Have High and Increasing Social Value
As seen in the U.S. mobile market, wireless wide area networks (WWANs) have produced extremely high usage growth rates over the past decade and a half.
62 Such networks rely critically on exclusive rights to control radio spectrum; neither traditional licenses nor unlicensed bandwidth are able to generate similar investments enabling mobile wireless connectivity. 63 Large mobile networks have materialized only with relatively liberal exclusive rights. Moreover, additional bandwidth allocated to liberal licenses results in lower service prices and greater outputs, revealing that large social benefits are available at the relevant policy margin. These networks incorporate the -smart‖ radio technologies said to presage a rejection of private property rights, including spread spectrum (the innovation behind Qualcomm's CDMA technology embedded in many 2G, and all
62.
See infra Figure 1 . 63.
The primary social justification for property rights is to protect investors who create ( Voice minutes -consumed‖ by U.S. retail subscribers increased from under 100 billion annually in the mid 1990s to 1.8 trillion in 2006. The upsurge was caused in part by a sharp decline in the average price per minute of use, from over 50¢ in 1994 to 7¢ in 2006. But it was also attributed to the large increase in the scope and quality of networks and handsets used in the -mobile ecology.‖ These improvements, in turn, were a product of investments made by network carriers and the producers of complementary products.
Unlicensed bands do not specifically exclude WWANs or the mobile applications that are in high demand by consumers. Benkler suggests that mesh networks-where wireless local area networks (WLANs) using unlicensed wireless link themselves together-effectively substitute for WWANs and add to social efficiency by replacing network operators with user-owned investments.
67
This competitive substitution has been free to occur since the advent of cellular wireless networks; indeed, unlicensed bands were deregulated-permitted to accommodate spread spectrum radios in 1985-before cellular networks in 1987. 68 Mesh technologies have been deployed, in both licensed and unlicensed spectrum in network-centric configurations (generally for military and other government applications) since the 1980s. But there is no tendency for the networks using unlicensed devices to displace WWANs using licensed spectrum.
A Market Migration Towards Increasingly Efficient "Spectrum Commons" Would Undercut the Social and Private Value Associated with Liberal Licenses
Were the non-exclusive rights issued in unlicensed bands increasingly better substitutes for exclusively owned airwaves, service suppliers would shift their production to exploit the less-expensive inputs. Demand for liberal licenses would wane. This is not what is observed, however. In 1995, when only 50 MHz was available to cellular operators and a local service duopoly in cellular generated considerable industry rents, the FCC's sale of PCS A and B block licensesassigning licenses allocated a total of 60 MHz, and increasing per-market rivalry to 66.
CDMA (code division multiple access) packs more data into transmissions by reducing power, spreading signals over wider bandwidth, and then using sophisticated algorithms to untangle (de-code) messages occupying the same frequency space. TDMA (time division multiple access) leaves frequency channels exclusive for particular links (or conversations) but divvies up connections into short, alternating bursts, accommodating several calls per channel at one time. CDMA Id.
73.
Id. 75. Marcus, supra note 22, at 31.
wideband technologies heralded as game changing 76 ), has not triggered evidence of a property paradigm regime shift.
This cursory examination is not adjusted for inflation, band differentials (the quality of 700 MHz airwaves is relatively high, for example), or other factors. Yet, it is sufficiently compelling to counter the categorical claim that a technological revolution is sweeping away the social utility of exclusive property rights in spectrum. The bidding behavior by wireless service providers, continuing to offer billions of dollars to obtain bandwidth exclusivity, reveals that there do not exist zero-priced inputs available that today-or anytime soon-are expected to serve as productive substitutes. First, it omits mobile service revenues, which are much larger than annual capital expenditures (-capex‖). U.S. consumers, for example, spend about $150 billion annually for mobile services.
Investments in Networks Relying on Exclusive Spectrum Rights Dominate Those Made in Unlicensed Spectrum by Orders of Magnitude
77 While these retail payments overlap equipment revenues to some degree (payments to carriers are then used to pay for handsets and capex), the service revenues are far higher. Conversely, service revenues for wireless services provided in unlicensed spectrum, e.g., at -hot spots,‖ are comparatively insignificant.
Second, this approach partitions investments into the respective band allocations. While this may serve as a useful first approximation as to incremental spectrum values, it over-counts the contribution of unlicensed bands, where services rely heavily on the networks they complement. Wide area broadband services are supplied by privately owned bandwidth--spectrum in a tube.‖ The same is true of voice telephone networks. As cordless phones do not displace telephone exchange facilities but complement and extend the network, so Wi-Fi connections complement and extend Ethernet, cable modem, and DSL services. The mobile wireless network does not similarly rely on complements 78 provided by non-exclusive (or unlicensed) spectrum use rights. 78. Unlicensed devices do add to wide area network value at the margin, but not to the same degree as the reverse situation. It is possible to think of a telephone network without cordless phones (which we had for many decades), but not vice versa.
79. Baby monitors, garage door openers, remote controls, and other non-network wireless devices are not complements to such systems. Yet, the value of such services does not rely on unlicensed allocations, as they could be supplied by spectrum access rights Third, expenditures on equipment and services for broadcasting and other important radio services are excluded. These applications are supplied partly via traditional licenses rather than liberal licenses. 80 But the economic value created could be wholly produced via frequency rights purchased from liberal license holders. Unlicensed bands do not afford the same opportunities. Even with these exclusions a stark verdict emerges: the overwhelming economic activity in the wireless sector, as measured by equipment expenditures, occurs with efforts to utilize bandwidth supplied by liberal licenses.
U.S. markets also reveal that the vast bulk of expenditures for wireless consumer electronics (ignoring service revenues and capex by service providers) are for devices that rely on embedded licensed spectrum access capability. Table 3 , with data from the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), suggests that consumer purchases of cell phones, smart phones, and digital television sets dominate this market segment. The latter are, in over 90% of U.S. TV viewing, connected to cable or satellite connections, 83 delivered via exclusive spectrum rights. 84 Cordless phones, the only important product relying on unlicensed bandwidth for connectivity that CEA tracks, represents only a small and declining fraction of sector revenues. Smart phones, meanwhile, are growing very rapidly in unit sales and in total receipts. These trends appear to be accelerating. In mobile markets, the build-out of 3G and 4G networks is in its early stages and is expected to continue the rapid expansion of applications and usage. 86 The confluence of innovative devices and rising demand for mobile computing is anticipated to drive more and more traffic. 87 The trend underway is for market forces to place greater reliance on licensed spectrum, not less. Ofcom is the independent regulator and competition authority for the UK communications industries.
89. See infra Table 4 . 90.
This accounting likely over-counts the net value of terrestrial broadcasting, in that the opportunity cost of TB band spectrum and alternative delivery platformsspecifically, satellite broadcasting-are potential low-cost substitutes. These factors may also bias the fixed wireless value estimate upwards to some degree, yet they are not likely to influence the mobile telephony projections where alternative low-cost platforms are not available. 
Growth in Services Delivered via Exclusively Owned Bandwidth Is Robust
Were new wireless technologies equipping consumers with the tools to replace networks and applications that rely on owned spectrum inputs, not only would unlicensed bands be economically eclipsing licensed bands, fixed networks-where spectrum ownership falls under traditional property rights uncomplicated by the -public interest‖ directives of spectrum allocation-would relatively decline. This is not observed. Instead, the broadband market is growing rapidly, dominated by cable TV operators and telephone carriers.
92
The argument for regime change includes a prediction that unlicensed bands will out-compete such expensive centralized networks as consumers avail themselves of smart radios. With spectrum scarcity rendered obsolete, the logic is clear: even cheap user devices will have capacity to spare. With internet access provided by Wi-Fi or ultra-wideband devices, and WLAN nodes linked in ad hoc, user-operated meshes, the market spontaneously tilts to favor the emerging lowercost opportunities. The argument has been sufficiently persuasive as to push policy makers to allocate additional unlicensed bandwidth. 
94.
See infra Table 5 . 95.
Speaking of 802.11x devices, the FCC writes: -These networks have met with tremendous success, and increasingly have been used by Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs)-which may number as many as 8,000 providers-to provide a facilities-based alternative to wireline (e.g., DSL) and cable services to millions of Americans over networks that may range in size from small communities, to multiple counties, to multi-regional geographic areas or even larger.‖ Ass'n for Maximum Serv. While Wi-Fi is a popular WLAN technology, it largely complements rather than displaces the broadband access services provided by privately owned cable and telephone operators. Hence, the success of in-home, in-business, and oncampus WLANs is economically leveraged on the investments made by firms that-in creating networks governed by private property-employ exclusive rights to protect investments from appropriation. The fewer than 350,000 unlicensed WISP subscribers recorded by the FCC 100 compare to the more than sixty-nine million broadband subscribers served by cable modem and DSL services, and over fifty million high-access customers paying for mobile internet access. 100. See Annual Report, supra note 97.
101.
See supra Table 5 ; infra Table 6. services depending on exclusive spectrum rights are, as yet, growing rapidly and evince no indication of being displaced by unlicensed WISPs. In short, the rapid technological progress in wireless communications is not shifting market activity from exclusive rights. Robust growth throughout the communications sector is most pronounced where private ownership over frequency inputs accommodates complex network coordination, including that between long-term investors and future customers, and the most intense spectrum sharing. This trend appears not to be waning but accelerating, as entrepreneurial platforms such as the RIM Blackberry, Apple iPhone, Palm Pre, and the Google gPhone contract with carriers to launch new devices and innovative applications in competitive rivalry with each other. The -mobile ecology‖ is rapidly growing in terms of new investment, usage, and widening scope in the service menu.
Wireless services provided via unlicensed bandwidth have enjoyed the sectoral trend. The services thus accommodated are regulated, constrained by power limits and technology mandates, affording only non-exclusive use rights. This has made such bands serviceable for certain applications, but handicapped for others. The activities that such bands support are largely limited to short-range radio services that either need no network or can simply plug into one. More sophisticated architectures inevitably favor the economic environment yielded by exclusive spectrum ownership. As such, market activity today strongly supports Coase's 1959 view of the efficacy of spectrum markets.
II. THE DIGITAL TV TRANSITION
A. History
Broadcast television allocations were made by the FCC between 1939 and 1953 when large parts of the VHF and UHF bands were set aside. 103 Each station license was allocated 6 MHz; there would be room for eighty-one channels (channels 2 to 83, with channel 37 allocated to non-TV services), or 486 MHz. 104.
Id.
Despite the generous allocation, only three national broadcast networks were accommodated (ABC, CBS, NBC), a product of the system of -localism‖ used to create stations in many smaller markets. This led the FCC to leave the vast majority of local channels blank or -taboo.‖
105
In 1985-1986, Motorola and public safety agency officials, spying the little-used UHF TV airwaves and the burgeoning development of cellular networks, requested that additional frequencies be reallocated by the FCC from TV to -land mobile.‖ 106 The cellular allocation-two 25 MHz bands in the 800 MHz frequencies-had been peeled away from the original TV allocations. That reallocation, which began formally in 1968, stripped TV channels 70 to 83, or 84 MHz (14 * 6 MHz) from the TV Band; 50 MHz of this total was allocated to cellular. Cellular operators (two in each of 734 local markets) were then licensed in the 1983-1989 period, primarily by lotteries.
107
By July 1987, the FCC had developed a proposal to further reallocate UHF TV airwaves allocated to channels 60 to 69. 108 These assignments hosted few broadcast TV stations, all of which could be moved to other channels. To preempt official action on the matter, however, broadcasters forced a policy option that would leave idle TV frequencies undisturbed: -advanced television.‖ 109 Unused channels might be needed for the transition; the band was frozen pending implementation of the new plan. 110 The 402 MHz then allotted to terrestrial broadcasting would be left in place so as to accommodate the transition.
111
B. Technology Transition via Spectrum Allocation
The FCC appointed an advisory committee to develop a new standard for advanced television. 112 The Advanced Television Systems Committee (ATSC), headed by former FCC Chairman Richard Wiley, allowed competing consortia to submit rival standards. 113 After much contentiousness, a Grand Alliance was formed.
114 It adopted a digital broadcasting standard, an innovation representing considerable technical advance. 115 Id. at 27. 111.
112.
Id. at 231-35.
113.
114.
Id. at 238-39.
115.
Id. at 258-63.
directive that stations broadcast high definition (HD) signals. 116 This was relaxed in 1996, when stations were permitted the freedom to broadcast digital video programs either in HD or in standard definition (SD). 117 The latter would allow other services, including multiplexed SD signals or data streams, to be offered in the 19.4 mbps capacity of the ATSC broadcast format.
Congress enacted rules in the 1997 budget to guide the DTV transition.
118
TV licensees were given a second -digital‖ channel, 119 and stations were required to simulcast, on a phased-in schedule, both analog and digital formats.
120 Most important was the analog cut-off date: analog TV stations were to cease operations by the end of 2006 except in markets where fewer than 85% of households could receive off-air digital broadcast signals.
121 This 85% standard was virtually impossible to meet, given that cable and satellite TV subscribers had little incentive to buy off-air digital tuners, and that cable and satellite subscription services were not counted towards the 85% even when such firms would have carried digital broadcast signals after analog signals went dark.
With few customers buying digital off-air tuners, the transition lagged. In 
C. Receivers
In 2002 the FCC mandated that TV sets sold in the United States include digital signal (off-air) receivers according to a phased-in schedule. 124 The rules were fully in place by July 2007. 125 This forced buyers of new sets to purchase equipment that was unnecessary when receivers were connected to cable or satellite video services.
To further encourage the deployment of digital receivers, subsidies funded the purchase of consumer devices to translate digital off-air signals for
116.
In 130 Network affiliates and the stronger independent broadcast stations generally negotiate such -retransmission consent‖ agreements, which risks non-carriage if the negotiations fall through, while small independent stations use -must carry.‖ 131 A controversy has emerged over whether the digital TV broadcaster enjoys must-carry rights over multiple sub-channels. Thus far, the FCC has interpreted its mandate as applying -must carry‖ only to the station's -primary‖ program feed. The effect is that stations that elect to multiplex are broadcasting to a very thin audience for the sub-channel programming beyond the main channel. About 91% of homes, 132 and well over 91% of TV viewers, will not generally receive programming as they are watching subscription service content rather than receiving off-air terrestrial signals. 133. Of course, broadcasters are free to negotiate retransmission with cable operators. This is an option available to any potential programmer, not just broadcast stations. Customers are also able to use -A/B‖ switches that permit them to flip back and forth from an off-air antenna to cable/satellite connections. Such switches are embedded in low cost remote controls.
-Must carry‖ is an important policy. In particular, it gives a TV station the incentive to continue broadcasting in order to maintain their -free‖ access to the most important distribution platforms. Ironically, many TV stations turned off their analog broadcasts prior to 2009 in order to obtain a -new & improved mustcarry right,‖ awarded by virtue of the larger footprint associated with digital signals in FCC computer models. 134 The loss of all of their over-the-air viewers was more than compensated for by the gain they realized via extra cable and satellite coverage.
E. Results of the Transition
The June 12, 2009 analog switch-off was essentially a non-event. 135 Given that high-demand video consumers, and the great majority of low-demand viewers, subscribe to cable or satellite systems where broadcast station programming is seamlessly carried to customers via alternative platforms, the loss of analog broadcasting went largely unnoticed. It was likened to Y2K: a hyped disaster that passed without incident.
136
By the time the twenty-two year transition was over, terrestrial TV broadcasting was nearly finished as a transmission mechanism. Household migration to subscription Multi-channel Video Program Distribution (MVPD) services was nearing completion. Moreover, the incremental transition could be economically achieved, given multiple MVPD platforms with national coverage and the relatively small number of homes lacking connections.
F. The State of Play
Across 210 TV markets, there are about 1750 full-power stations-just over eight per market. 137 Before the analog switch-off in June 2009, with sixtyseven allocated TV channels in every market, average channel utilization was just 12%. 138 With the move to all-digital programming, half of the broadcast transmissions ended-and all those in channels 52 to 69. The digital channels that remain imply a utilization rate of 16%. The remaining 64 MHz allotted 700 MHz licenses is largely controlled by AT&T and Verizon, the two largest U.S. wireless carriers. 143 These carriers have announced that the bandwidth will be used in conjunction with 4G network upgrades using new LTE technologies, 144 yielding faster and more capacious broadband data connections. While wireless network investors had been hoping to see a reduction in capital outlays-the industry invested some $219 billion over the 1998 through 2008 period, excluding spectrum acquisition costs 145 -the rapid growth in wireless applications and usage, combined with market dynamics compelling rival networks to compete on service quality, continue to drive such expense.
Spectrum is both a complement to and a substitute for telecommunications infrastructure. A given network can provide better service with given network assets by accessing greater bandwidth. This frequency space complements existing infrastructure, while substituting for new investments (such as cell splitting). 146 -suggests that spectrum is very valuable to networks at the margin. Indeed, these two license sales account for a total of $33 billion in receipts, over 60% of all FCC license revenues between 1994 and 2010. 147 Carriers remain hungry for additional bandwidth. This is seen not only in the license auction prices, but also in the lobbying position taken by Cellular Telecommunications & Internet Association (CTIA), the carriers' trade association. CTIA pressures regulators to make more spectrum available for auction.
Auctions
148 This is a noteworthy development. The traditional approach by broadcast licensees has been for regulators to limit new allocations, protecting incumbents from competitive entry.
149 New auctions open a pathway for entrants. This is what happened in the 2006 AWS auction, where a consortium of cable TV operators won a 20 MHz nationwide block, 150 and where the smallest of four incumbent networks obtained the capacity to build a wireless broadband (3G) network, increasing rivalry in data services.
That wireless operators see a lack of spectrum as an impediment flags the reality that carriers would prefer to obtain future spectrum inputs at lower cost than to seek to protect their existing infrastructure from competitive entry. CTIA complains that there is only 50 MHz in the FCC pipeline for new mobile licenses (AWS-2, AWS-3), and urges regulators to find more airwave space to accommodate wireless networks. 151 There exists 294 MHz of prime spectrum that supplies almost no social dividend-the DTV Band.
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III. REALLOCATING THE TV BAND FOR PRODUCTIVE USE
There are two striking aspects of the DTV transition from a consumer welfare perspective. The first is that the analog-to-digital transmission upgrade has had little direct impact on the market for video distribution, which fundamentally shifted to MVPD subscription services due to market forces. 153 The second is that the emergence of wireless voice and data services over the past two decades makes Today, the opportunity cost of using the TV Band for television broadcasting-294 MHz of spectrum with excellent propagation characteristics for mobile voice and data networks, including 3G and 4G technologies-is conservatively estimated to exceed $1 trillion. 159 These projections are based on the issuance of liberal licenses, which enable the most intense demands to be supplied.
A. FCC's Unlicensed Approach
With the modest utilization of TV Band airwaves there is widespread consensus that more wireless services can be accommodated. 160 The basic policy choice is how to allow additional -band sharing.‖ The FCC, in a decision tentatively announced in December 2002, 161 164 To be authorized for manufacture and sale, devices must locate frequencies not in local use by broadcasters and then avoid emissions that might degrade TV reception. 165 Rather than conduct an economic analysis, the Commission signaled its selection of the unlicensed path thus:
The Commission's rules for unlicensed transmitters have been a tremendous success . . . . The success of our unlicensed device rules for the ISM bands shows that there could be significant benefits to the economy, businesses and the general public in making additional spectrum available for unlicensed transmitters. 166 The categorical endorsement lacks an analysis of the relevant margins. The -tremendous success‖ conclusion, as applied to the historic performance of previous unlicensed allocations, is curiously incomplete, as allocations for unlicensed services beyond those made for Industrial, Scientific, and Medical devices (ISM) have often proven-by the Commission's own findings-to be unsuccessful. These include the U-PCS bands noted above. Even were the previous allocations a -tremendous success,‖ the issue under consideration is whether the allocation of additional bandwidth would yield further results that dominate alternative options for achieving other -tremendous successes.‖ That implies, first, important incremental services that the constraints of the existing allocations do not accommodate. 167 Some economists and engineers argue that unlicensed TV white spaces are unlikely to generate substantial economic value because incremental demand for unlicensed access is low. 168 Others note that DTV Band frequencies, by virtue of their excellent propagation characteristics, will prove of little value for unlicensed device use. 169 When signals easily flow through walls and fade only slowly, conflicts between users are potentially more rampant; device regulation (power limits, etc.) will have to be concomitantly more severe. 170 This skepticism is buttressed by the fact that no firm, including those lobbying for additional unlicensed allocations, has bid for 700 MHz licenses with the intention of making naked spectrum (without a wireless network) available for approved devices.
Second, and reflecting the last point, the incremental allocation must be shown to face opportunity costs-namely, the welfare gains available from liberal
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See In re Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, 17 FCC Rcd. at 25,634.
167. The -end of scarcity‖ argument is repudiated by the lobbying efforts of advocates for additional -spectrum commons.‖ That unlicensed devices would productively utilize additional bandwidth taken from other productive employments reveals the underlying resource constraints. 170.
Id. at 1.
licenses-of less than the proffered benefits. While auction bidders must, the FCC's methodology simply fails to evaluate the trade-offs involved. Most ominously, by ignoring the benefits of property rights in moving TV broadcasters out of the DTV Band, the Commission ensures that the decades-old misallocation of spectrum will prevail for generations to come. This offers a textbook illustration of the tragedy of the anticommons.
171
B. Implicit Economic Trade-offs in the Unlicensed Allocation
Perhaps the easiest way to see the basic problem is to consider the FCC's efforts to accommodate DTV Band spectrum sharing. Specifically, regulators seek to permit the use of unoccupied frequencies by approving radio devices that will leave TV reception unaffected.
172 This approach catastrophically errs in missing the key misallocation-that the technically occupied DTV channels are not economically employed. It then compounds the error by seeking to create new, non-exclusive use rights that will render rational reorganization of the band impossible. Once truncated, overlapping, non-exclusive use rights are distributed, TV stations will be frozen in place. The transactions required to efficiently relocate them will be lost in a sea of extreme rights fragmentation.
Economic agents with incentives to invest in enhancing resource value are needed to engineer band reallocation. Exclusive overlay holders have such incentives, and would offer to buy out TV stations to make the underlying bandwidth more valuable:
One of the purposes of the legal system is to establish that clear delimitation of rights on the basis of which the transfer and 171.
Kevin Martin, FCC Chair 2005-09, testified before the U.S. Senate that the FCC was unable to allocate the white spaces via licenses because it would have created delays:
It would be more difficult and potentially actually even delay a little bit the full utilization of the white spaces to try to actually license off the white spaces, because it would first require us, from a technical standpoint, to identify exactly what all the white space was. Whereas, if we could adopt general rules which said, ‗We think you can operate under these parameters without causing interference, and then you can do so as long as you're not causing interference,' it would be more easily able to allow the technological innovations that are occurring in unlicensed to more fully utilize that spectrum. , available at rtsp://avs.senate.gov/commerce020107.rm (archived video at 1:16:59). The statement stands as a sterling example of the results-based reasoning that FCC rulemakings are rightly famous for. The FCC long ago began issuing overlay rights for TV white spaces in the 700 MHz band, and those rights have supported many transactions and services. Conversely, the unlicensed devices that the Commission is pursuing for the DTV Band have, since the Commission announced its intention to authorize them in 2002, not led to any approved devices over the intervening years. That delay is to -identify exactly what all the white space was.‖ The FCC elects to ignore these delays, treating them as free.
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recombination of rights can take place through the market. In the case of radio, it should be possible for someone who is granted the use of a frequency to arrange to share it with someone else, with whatever adjustments to hours of operation, power, location and kind of transmitter, etc., as may be mutually agreed upon; or when the right initially acquired is the shared use of a frequency (and in certain cases the FCC has permitted only shared usage), it should not be made impossible for one user to buy out the rights of the other users so as to obtain an exclusive usage.
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The potential to create problem-solving residual claimants, however, is obliterated by the insertion of wholesale non-exclusive use rights. Gains from trade disappear. TV broadcasters, who would lose little by abandoning over-the-air transmissions and unleash far superior profit opportunities by making VHF/UHF airwaves available for alternative services, cannot share in the benefits-now allocated to limitless unlicensed users. The investments necessary to produce social gains are preempted by the tragedy of the anticommons.
In short, the FCC has chosen to extend administrative allocation. With non-exclusive use rights, it falls to the Commission to resolve conflicts by defining white spaces and determining what devices may be used to access them. The aim is to approve White Space Devices (WSDs) that will not substantially conflict with DTV reception. 174 Because TV channel assignments vary from market to market (for example, Channel 2 is used in New York City and Baltimore but not in Philadelphia or Washington, D.C.) and because FCC-approved devices are likely to be used nationwide, device emissions must be alert and agile, steering clear of local broadcasting signals. In the FCC's words:
An important consideration in the proceeding is how to ensure that unlicensed devices operate only on vacant frequencies. One approach under consideration is for the WSD to employ -smart radio‖ features that would use a -detect and avoid‖ or -spectrum sensing‖ strategy. An alternative approach would rely on accessing a database of licensed services to identify active services near the device's location. The device location would be determined by an integral geo-location technology, such as GPS.
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To engineer devices to detect and avoid the broadcasts of the interspersed TV stations increases the costs of device manufacture, shortens battery life, and reduces bandwidth. 176 Indeed, the purpose of detection technology is to restrict 173. Coase, supra note 2, at 25. 174.
- access to various channels. These involve co-channel spectrum (on which TV stations broadcast locally) and adjacent channel spectrum (co-channel neighbors). All these restrictions truncate the incremental value available to consumers.
One standard limitation is to constrain unlicensed devices to fixed usage on the grounds that conflicts between rival users become more difficult to predict (and mitigate) when radios are on the move. Hence, the FCC plans to limit fixed WSD operations differently than nomadic (-personal/portable‖) devices.
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Reflecting various economic tradeoffs, the FCC set the following rules:
Fixed usage devices:
o may access any TV channel between 2 and 51, except channels 3, 4, and 37; o must avoid co-channel and adjacent channel operations; o may operate at a maximum power of 4 watts. Personal portable usage devices:
o may access any unoccupied channel between 21 and 51, except channel 37; o must avoid co-channel operations; o may operate at a maximum power of 100 milliwatts; o operation limited to just 40 milliwatts on adjacent channels.
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Because no avoidance system works perfectly, standards must be set to determine whether a given technology works well enough. This analysis has many dimensions; the key policy issues here involve adjacent channel protection (imposed for fixed devices) and power limits (sharply reduced for nomadic devices, which can use adjacent channels).
Available bandwidth shrinks. How much will depend on the devices and technologies ultimately approved, and then on the effectiveness of the approved devices in competing with other applications in providing services to consumers. If the power limits and operating-overhead burdens prove too onerous to be worth the cost (even to buyers who do not have to outbid competing uses of the spectrum), the white spaces may continue to lie idle. Perhaps worse yet is the prospect that some devices will access the allocated spectrum but provide incremental consumer value that is less than the opportunity cost of the DTV band. Such activity masks the tragedy of the anticommons.
C. Spectrum Reallocation
Rival models (incorporating distinct assumptions about airwave conflicts) estimate different levels of bandwidth availability in the white spaces. Yet, as a starting point, a study entered into the FCC record by Qualcomm in January 2007 is of interest. 179 The paper projected that-assuming 95% coverage in each Under any likely scenario, only a modest fraction of the -unoccupied‖ frequency space in the TV Band will be made available for new applications. This is a product of the fact that DTV broadcasting itself represents economically "unused" spectrum, 182 given that broadcast content can be inexpensively delivered via alternative platforms. Not only have 91% of U.S. households already contracted out of the -free,‖ off-the-air TV delivery system by electing to pay for subscription services using coaxial cables or satellite transmitters-systems that include locally available off-air TV channels in their program menus-but three competing service options are available for connecting the last ten million households which do not yet subscribe to such services. 183 These three competing delivery systems are (a) the local cable TV operator, which passes over 99% of U.S. households; 184 (b) two satellite operators, DirecTV and Echostar, each of which has a national footprint; and (c) emerging competition in local video wireline service. Local video wireline service is now present with telephone carrier build-outs, most importantly by AT&T and Verizon, creating a fourth video subscription option for over one-fourth of U.S. households. 
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See id. at 17 tbl.7. 182. This demonstrates the difference between technical efficiency, as measured by engineering studies that look at how the capacity of a band is being used, and economic efficiency, which measures the net social value generated. TV stations blast high-power emissions, -using‖ a large amount of band capacity. But the emissions waste both spectrum and electricity, given that the incremental gain to customers provided by the transmitted radiation is (much) less than the opportunity cost of the inputs.
183. Broadcast content delivery over MVPD links, already the primary distribution system, can accommodate increased coverage at low incremental cost. Marginal households can be connected to existing networks for less than $300 each, an estimate that includes customer premises equipment (set top boxes, dishes, internal wiring) and installation. 187 To expand MVPD coverage to ~100% of households would require adding ten million connections, 188 or $3 billion in aggregate. Indeed, costs could well be much less were the task of connecting these households put out for bid. 189 Rival firms or consortia could offer to assume the obligation for distributing broadcast video programming to the defined subset of households. Marginal costs (including royalties) for broadcast content transmission would be nil; an existing platform simply expands to replace existing over-the-air distribution. MVPD suppliers also benefit by establishing customer relationships with millions of new households, and their bids in a procurement auction reflect anticipated profits from up-selling additional content.
Hence, $3 billion is an upper-bound estimate of the cost of completing the transition of terrestrial broadcasting to alternative media. The value of the DTV Band, allocated to liberal licenses, is at least two orders of magnitudes greater. 190 Yet, by keeping TV stations in place and burdening unlicensed devices to detect and avoid broadcast signals that few are watching and that none gain by watching over-the-air, the DTV Band will remain economically dormant.
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The FCC has estimated that, population-adjusted, the mean U.S. TV market hosts thirteen channels. This estimate is used, rather than the unadjusted mean of eight stations per market.
187. Goldman Sachs analysts estimate the Subscriber Acquisition Cost (SAC) for a new satellite TV customer on the DISH (EchoStar) network at $455. Of this, $60 is for marketing and $100 for commissions. Under the household connection program here, such costs would be avoided. The net wholesale cost for the provider is $295, of which $25 is for one -low-end‖ set-top converter box and one satellite dish. JASON ARMSTRONG ET AL., GOLDMAN FCC simultaneously holds a reverse auction to equip ten million non-MVPD households with, say, ten-year MVPD -broadcast TV‖ service.
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The overlays shift the spectrum reallocation task from administrative allocation to asset owners operating under market constraints. Incumbents would bargain with entrants (overlay holders) to capture gains generated by relocating. Because the number of transactors in each deal is small, and the potential economic gains in freeing broadcast TV spectrum for alternative services are large, the strong likelihood is that the market will soon renovate the DTV Band. Hold-out problems are not likely to be serious because the marginal gains from unanimous, as opposed to near-unanimous, broadcaster relocation do not overwhelm bilateral gains. To buttress this result, rules analogous to the -paid-for‖ relocations of PCS microwave users could be instituted, accompanied by streamlined arbitration procedures.
E. Junk Band Endogeneity
The ISM bands that host cordless phones and Wi-Fi devices are often referenced as junk bands, in which popular new devices have been accommodated at little social cost. 203 There is considerable truth in the claim, conditional on the
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Protections for incumbents (contour borders) can be defined as in the 700 MHz licenses. Those licenses, and subsequent FCC rules, permitted Qualcomm to buy interference permission from scores of analog TV stations so as to launch MediaFlo in 2007.
200. TV stations are not required to continue broadcasting currently. They are only required to continue broadcasting-emitting one-way broadcast content across all 6 MHz allocated to their licenses-in order to retain control of their license. They are free to forfeit the license to the FCC without penalty. The necessary feature of the overlay innovation is that an overlay licensee retains control of the allocated bandwidth in the event of a TV license forfeiture.
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Obviously, other -spectrum cap‖ rules can be used. This provision highlights that the market concentration issue can be addressed by competition policy remedies, including antitrust regulation. It cannot appropriately be an objection to the overlay policy in principle.
202. See Hazlett, Unleashing the DTV Band, supra note 158, at 9-11. 203.
Philip J. Weiser, The Untapped Promise of Wireless Spectrum 11 (Brookings Institution Hamilton Project, Discussion Paper No. 2008) , available at regulatory choices already made. The frequencies in question have historically hosted many emitting devices (both for communications and non-communications purposes, as with microwave ovens) via non-exclusive use rights. 204 In this environment, coordination is left to administrative process. Residual claimants are excluded, and capital markets cannot be used to finance improvements, as occurs when cellular networks migrate their customers from analog to digital phones, increase quality of service by relocating incumbent wireless users, or expand spectrum capacity by buying additional licenses.
In the TV white spaces allocation, the FCC characterizes the opportunity to add additional economic value through the authorization of unlicensed devices as a free lunch. 205 Opportunity costs are ignored; the DTV Band is seen to be producing little of value and is riddled with idle white spaces. That outcome is determined not by nature but by regulation. Moreover, to infuse the TV Band with non-exclusive use rights is to forego the fix that could be created by spectrum owners. Efficiency-creating transactions that relocate TV stations and clean up the DTV Band are preempted. With unlicensed allocations, relocations depend on administrative rule makings-exactly the process that created tragedy.
Unlicensed users cannot pay TV stations to relocate to cable and satellite platforms because limitless -owners‖ would capture future benefits. This ensures that the DTV Band maintains its junk status. Alternatively, liberal license overlays enable residual claimants to move resources into higher valued uses, analogous to when the 700 MHz license bidders paid $19 billion for a -reallocation‖ of spectrum in Auction 73.
Overlay transactions reveal the opportunity costs of VHF/UHF radio spectrum, and this knowledge facilitates efficiency in further allocations, including those that may be made for unlicensed devices. If public authorities were to determine that the value of additional bandwidth for unlicensed devices would generate a social net of opportunity costs, some fraction of the overlays could be acquired-through purchase, taking, or regulatory set aside-for the purpose. As this policy analysis is nested within current FCC practices and procedures, the regulatory set-aside path is assumed. The economically superior approach sold with this encumbrance. The license holder would then relocate TV station broadcasts, realizing its obligation. The license price would reflect the expected cost of the band clearing operation and could be negative-the government would pay the overlay licensee. However, I have constructed the policy to avoid that effect-offsetting the obligation, the licensee captures the value of 22 MHz of DTV spectrum. In any event, the result would be that unlicensed devices could access dedicated, nationwide bandwidth, shedding the overhead of detection and avoidance of interspersed TV broadcasting signals.
Of course, bandwidth could be purchased by a private bidder at auction and used for -naked spectrum‖ (non-network) access financed via a device license fee. 208 Alternatively, device makers could, individually or as a consortium, cut out the broker and integrate into spectrum ownership. Finally, public agencies could directly acquire bandwidth through market purchase or government taking.
Perhaps the most important institutional advantage of overlays lies in the remedy they supply for the must-carry hold-up: ending policy gridlock. Broadcasters have a strong incentive to continue off-air transmissions simply to retain -must carry.‖ The suggestion is made that Congress should redo the rights, granting them to broadcasters in perpetuity but not making them dependent on offair transmissions. That approach would not be credible. Station owners understand that stand alone must-carry rights would be insecure. Indeed, the constitutionality of -must carry‖ was premised, by the Supreme Court in Turner, on maintaining the economic viability of free, over-the-air television. Removing the rationale for the policy directly undercuts public support and its legal standing, threatening its longrun viability. This recalls one of the striking features of water misallocation. Irrigation districts often refuse to make profitable water sales because the farmers (who control the irrigation districts) understand that their assets would likely be appropriated were they to give up the activity for which they were awarded the property right. 209 So here with broadcasters, who see that no regulator can write a contract that guarantees broadcaster carriage rights in a post-broadcast environment.
Negotiated agreements among private parties often achieve what regulation cannot. 210 Private contracts can easily be written to guarantee long-term carriage of TV signals on cable and satellite systems. In fact, this contractual form is commonplace; hundreds of cable TV program networks are distributed to 100 million MVPD subscribers via long-term contracts.
The value-creating terms of the -broadcast‖ delivery guarantee are simple to outline. Overlay owners evince demand for carriage, as this helps to eliminate broadcast emissions, increasing spectrum value. MVPD providers have the capacity to supply such carriage and, indeed, already do. Shifting an existing (must-carry) liability to a long-term commitment, in exchange for consideration, improves the position of the operator. The price paid would likely be modest, in that local TV station content is valuable to viewers and the MVPD is competitively constrained. This retail rivalry preempts hold-up; a failure to secure long-term access to broadcast programming risks loss of market share. The potential of the DTV Band airwaves-$107 billion in license value, at March 2008 prices 211 -provides ample demand for band-clearing cooperation.
Overlay licenses could effect the efficient band reorganization that the FCC has not. The non-exclusive access model, however, will preempt this reallocation and, by littering the DTV Band with disaggregated and overlapping use rights, perpetuate anticommons tragedy. The contracts that need to be consummated are unsupported by the truncated operating permits issued to TV stations on the one side, and non-exclusive access rights issued to device users on the other. The value-destroying pollution of terrestrial broadcasting will remain in place as the gains to pollution-abatement cannot be captured.
In short, the rent-seeking equilibrium seeks to extend and protect broadcast television. So it is that champions of unlicensed white spaces cited in the FCC's 2008 Order oppose overlays because they would threaten to move over-theair broadcast stations. In response to the argument that overlay -licensees would be able to negotiate with TV broadcasters to relax the interference requirements in individual situations, and thereby allow greater use of the white spaces,‖ 212 the proponents of unlicensed allocations argue that:
[A]llowing broadcasters to negotiate to allow greater interference from white space devices would be contrary to broadcasters' public interest obligations to provide free TV service to viewers because some TV viewers would lose the ability to receive over the air TV service. 213 Hence, to make the argument for WSDs, proponents propose to freeze TV stations in place and block efforts to -unjunk‖ the band. That the argument is analytically incorrect-the -broadcasters' public interest obligations to provide free TV service‖ could be met at far lower social cost by shifting to alternative delivery platforms-is less interesting than the regulatory strategy revealed. The policy of rights fragmentation under the unlicensed model opposes market mechanisms that would preempt administrative allocation. This mandate is 211.
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sufficiently powerful as to lead to a defense of an antiquated TV broadcasting structure that destroys social wealth and blocks the great majority of the rich bandwidth that white space device users now seek to access, if only in slivers.
F. Protecting Non-MVPD Households and Non-TV Incumbents
A constraint on the clean-up operations of overlay licensees is the aforementioned -broadcasters' public service obligation to provide free TV service.‖ In fact, the political demand to make -free‖ broadcast TV programs available to nearly all U.S. homes can be achieved with platform neutrality. 214 The structural components of a system of all-MVPD household coverage are already in place. The shift could be completed by an increase in subscribership of only about ten million households (or a 10% increase on the approximately 100 million subscribers).
Connecting ten million additional households to MVPD platforms would require less than $3 billion, as noted. Overlay licenses, discounted for the encumbrances, would attract auction bids far exceeding this amount. A highly conservative methodology produces estimates of white space license revenues of between $9.4 billion and $24.4 billion, depending on the protections afforded broadcast station incumbents and the number of channels allocated to the licenses. 215 Given that licenses allocated 52 MHz of TV bandwidth sold for $19 billion in March 2008, even as auction bids were highly constrained (by perhaps $5 billion) by regulatory requirements imposed on the 22 MHz C license, 216 the aggregate value of the overlays described herein is very likely much higher.
There are incumbent users of the TV Band other than full-power TV stations, specifically low-power TV stations and wireless microphones. LPTV licensees could be vested in the same manner as full-power stations, and then relocated by overlay licensees. Given their small footprints, tenuous financial position, and the high desirability of shifting programming to local cable TV systems, 217 transactions (overlays paying cable operators to guarantee carriage in exchange for a cessation in broadcasting) would be likely. To ensure timely negotiations and prompt transitioning, overlay licenses could impose arbitration time lines as with PCS licenses.
Wireless microphones are a more interesting problem. Given the vast unoccupied space in the TV Band over the past many decades, rights to use wireless microphones in unoccupied UHF frequencies were granted by the FCC.
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This application was used by broadcasters in televising events, including sports programs, and has been extended to other entertainment venues such as live stage shows.
Wireless microphones have been used as white space devices, free to roam through vast, unutilized stretches of the TV Band. 219 FCC allocation of taboo channels dictated that only one in six channels could be used for TV station broadcasts within a given market. 220 Possessing no exclusive spectrum ownership rights, wireless microphone makers and users faced no opportunity costs in wasting spectrum. Wireless microphone technology stagnated. Now, permitting new devices to access idle TV Band spectrum is characterized as having dire consequences for existing services. The Sports TV Alliance has vigorously lobbied the FCC against it:
If FCC field tests cannot demonstrate a failsafe environment for incumbent wireless microphones, the FCC must be prepared to rule that the current state of technology doesn't justify moving forward with these white spaces proposals at this time, according to the filing.
More than 300 wireless microphones are routinely used at large events like the Super Bowl, the Daytona 500, and the NCAA Basketball Championship Tournament. -Any interference caused by wireless white spaces devices would seriously impair US sports event programming, affecting hundreds of millions of sports fansdenying them full enjoyment of these events . . . if the FCC fails to protect wireless microphones,‖ [said a spokesman for the Sports Technology Alliance]. 221 by the FCC-as a cheap alternative.
222 U.K. regulators have elected to pack wireless microphone transmissions into one 8 MHz TV channel (UHF channel 69 in the U.K.).
223 To achieve efficient migration, U.S. regulators could vest wireless microphone users with spectrum access rights in one specified, delimited, frequency space. An exclusive licensed band of no more than 8 MHz would suffice; other arrangements are possible. A recognized wireless microphone industry group should then be authorized to bargain with the overlay owner to adjust boundaries. 224 That such an application 225 could preempt deployment of exponentially more valuable services brings the NIMBY problem in radio spectrum to clarity. Proponents of unlicensed use of U.S. white spaces correctly note that wireless microphones squander resources, arguing that migrating these devices to less costly alternatives -would result in better long-term spectrum utilization.‖ 226 But the stated cause of the problem is misconstrued: -Free licensed spectrum with economic externalities usually results in lower direct costs to users than spectrum use based on marketplace forces . . . .‖ 227 The fact that rights have been granted without charge is not the problem, nor is the presence of -economic externalities.‖ 228 Rather, the lack of exclusive property rights over the spectrum preempts the auction process wherein those suffering harmful effects outbid the current users of the band. The wireless microphone makers and their customers own a non-exclusive right to pollute, and this pollution blocks a great deal of productive activity. Were they to actually own the resources in question they would maximize the value of the band. This would not end -economic externalities,‖ but exclude just those beneficial applications worth less than their cost. In short, the tragedy caused by wireless microphone is a product of the rules issued under administrative allocation of radio spectrum-precisely the regime that the unlicensed white-space devices would radically expand.
IV. CONCLUSION: PLANTING AND NURTURING A "JUNK BAND"
It is, of course, most important that we ensure that new unlicensed devices do not interfere with the incumbent licensed services in the TV Bands.
-Federal Communications Commission
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The current TV Band proceeding begins with the premise that TV broadcast stations are the most valuable use of 294 MHz of radio spectrum and that whatever additional communications can be squeezed in via unlicensed devices are a free lunch. But white spaces or taboo channels are not natural artifacts. They are a product of the administrative allocation system. The spectrum is, by the FCC's historical record, a buffer space needed to reduce potential conflicts. But the buffers offer little value; much greater social gains would result from alternative approaches to policing conflicts. The resulting economic tragedy is widely recognized, but not sufficiently well as to avoid gridlock in the solution.
The idea that TV broadcasting occupies the DTV Band is an optical illusion. In economic terms, TV broadcasting wastes the DTV Band. The white spaces do not occupy 24 MHz nationwide, but 294 MHz.
Advocates for unlicensed devices insist that, -The whole point . . . is to build a device that doesn"t interfere with TV signals.‖ 230 The FCC agrees. The administrative allocation regime is now freezing TV stations in place, intending to sprinkle tiny, fragmented, overlapping non-exclusive use rights all around them. The tragedy of the anticommons is leveraged. The transactions necessary for efficiency cannot be realized because residual claimants are needed to make the necessary band-clearing investments.
Instead, a rent-seeking rivalry rages. Since 2002, the FCC has sought to craft rules permitting spectrum sharing; it has yet to approve a single device. 231 Indeed, despite the high intelligence of smart radios, FCC tests have consistently found that prototypes submitted for approval have difficulty attaining perfect detection of existing TV signals, particularly on adjacent channels. 232 This creates an opening for incumbents to insist that wireless devices be -failsafe.‖ Cost is no
229.
In object. 233 With nary a household watching, a lengthy -angels on the head of a pin‖ debate proceeds. Broadcasters lobby Congress to vote for the interference rules of their liking, running television advertisements warning viewers that they will lose their -free‖ TV signals should unlicensed devices be permitted to use white spaces. WSD proponents are dismayed:
Ed Thomas, a former FCC chief engineer who represents the White Spaces Coalition, calls this nothing more than -a scare campaign.‖ -It lacks a scientific base . . . . What they're trying to do is create a political environment where science doesn't prevail, and I think that's appalling.‖ 234 Thomas's opinion is an informed one and his perspective reveals much. Most informative is that the larger truth is entirely missed. -Science‖ will not prevail because it cannot prevail. Despite the -technical‖ nature of the device approval process, the planning process is economic in nature. Government officials are actually evaluating costs and benefits, economic trade-offs dressed up as protocol choices. Policymakers have elected to make these choices among competing values rather than delegating them to markets. As Coase, Meckling & Minasian explained in 1962:
The range of alternative combinations is determined by technology -the state of the arts-and is an engineering problem. The ‗proper' combination actually to use to achieve a given goal is, however, an economic problem and is not (properly) soluble solely in terms of engineering data.
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There is no scientific basis for preferring unlicensed white space devices to liberal license overlays. It is not a technical determination to seek to protect broadcast TV stations from transitioning to more efficient content delivery platforms. Engineering principles cannot reveal whether the FCC's 4-watt power limit produces greater social benefit than the 20-watt power limit suggested by a group lobbying for WSDs because, -operations in the [other] unlicensed bands 233.
Or, conversely, the very object. Raising rivals' costs is a common strategy in political competitions.
234. Metz, supra note 230. Microsoft, Dell, Google and the Wireless Innovation Alliance declared yesterday -White Spaces‖ Day, to pitch the idea of using spectrum partially freed from the migration to digital TV to offer a new form of inexpensive wireless broadband. The lobbying fight on this front has been heavy, with the National Association of Broadcasters and incumbents, wary of new competition, using PR campaigns to suggest the new devices will cause wireless armageddon. Google Co-Founder Larry Page yesterday raised the rhetoric bar by declaring the FCC's tests of these new devices were -rigged.‖ . . . With so much lobbying muscle on both sides of this debate, the policy rhetoric overshadowed the technical discussion some time ago. 
